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Abstract
We study the effect of childcare availability on child penalties. Using Swiss
administrative data, we exploit the staggered opening of childcare facilities across
municipalities in the canton of Bern. We find that the presence of childcare facilities
in the year of birth of the first child reduces the child penalty. The availability of
childcare increases maternal earnings and decreases the compensating increase in
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1 Introduction
The narrowing of the gender gap in earnings has been one of the major advances in soci-
ety over the past decades. Goldin (2006) pointedly describes how over the past century,
women have evolved from passive workers, whose life cycle patterns were largely deter-
mined by economic necessity and marriage, to decision makers, whose “occupation and
employment define [their] societal worth.” Women’s higher investments in their education
and careers reflect increased intrinsic motivation to succeed in the labor market.
Despite the advances in women’s educational attainment and labor market attachment,
the gender earnings gap still widens substantially with age, especially in the 15 to 20 years
after leaving school (Goldin et al., 2017) and the birth of a first child still heavily affects
women’s life cycle earnings patterns.1 Goldin and Mitchell (2017) reason that the drop
in women’s earnings observed during their early to mid 30s has become more apparent
precisely because of the increase in employment at younger ages.
Recent literature argues that the divergence of female and male earnings following the
birth of their first child, also referred to as the “child penalty”, nowadays accounts for
most of the gender inequality in earnings. Kleven et al. (2019a) find that in Denmark,
earnings of mothers and fathers diverge by 20 percent in the long run.2 The resulting
differential impact of childbirth on lifetime earnings might adversely affect women in
their pension payments, savings, economic self-sufficiency, and their power in household
bargaining compared to men (Goldin et al., 2017). This suggests that addressing the
child penalty is first order when it comes to reducing gender inequality in earnings and its
consequences. It is therefore crucial to understand whether the differential is a deliberate
preference-based choice or whether it is brought about by a lack of institutions hindering
women, who would otherwise prefer to remain employed, to stay attached to the labor
market. A lack of affordable and available formal childcare arrangements is seen as one
major obstacle to the labor market attachment of mothers (see, e.g., Kleven et al., 2019a;
Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017).3
In this paper, we contribute to a better understanding of the child penalty by studying
whether childcare policies attenuate the drop in labor earnings, henceforth referred to as
earnings, women experience after the birth of their first child. We propose that the
institutional environment when the first child is born is a major determinant of female
earnings and employment patterns in subsequent years.
1See, e.g. Goldin et al. (2017) or Goldin (2014) for more detailed discussions of the persisting gender
earnings gap and how it is affected by children.
2Kleven et al. (2019b) extend the analysis in Kleven et al. (2019a) to six countries with varying policies
and norms, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They
show that the gender gap in earnings 10 years after the birth of the first child varies substantially between
countries, ranging from 20 percent in Denmark to 60 percent in Germany.
3Kleven et al. (2019a) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017), for example, argue that childcare is one
of the main reasons for the comparatively high labor market attachment of mothers in Scandinavian
countries.
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In order to establish the effect of childcare availability on the child penalty, we intro-
duce institutions into the event study framework. Switzerland is well-suited to study the
impact of childcare on the earnings penalty. Childcare facilities have only become more
prevalent in the past 20 years. The combination of administrative data on individuals’
earnings and the staggered opening of childcare facilities across municipalities in the can-
ton of Bern allows us to compare child penalties of parents in municipalities after the
introduction of childcare facilities to child penalties of parents in the same municipalities
before the introduction of childcare facilities in an otherwise homogeneous institutional
setting. We find a female child penalty (in earnings) of about 70 percent, which is partly
driven by a participation reduction of about 20 percent six years after the birth of the first
child. The documented earnings penalty is comparable to the one found for Germany (for
numbers on Germany and five other countries, see Kleven et al., 2019b). However, while
the reduction in female participation rates in Germany is a major factor in explaining the
earnings gap after the birth of a first child, in Switzerland the intensive margin, i.e., the
decision how much to work, seems especially relevant.
We find that the presence of a childcare facility in the municipality of residence at the
time of birth of a first child decreases the total child penalty by 8.2 percentage points
(10.4 percent) from 79 percent to 70.8 percent. More than 50 percent of this effect are
due to a reduction of the female child penalty by 4.5 percentage points (6.3 percent) from
71.4 percent to 66.9 percent. Childcare reduces the female child penalty in households
with below-median household earnings by 11.2 percentage points, which fully accounts for
the overall effect among women. We do not observe any statistically significant response
among women in households with above median earnings.4
A reduction in the increase in male earnings in the presence of childcare explains the
other half of the reduction in the child penalty. Without childcare, we find a positive
long-run response of male earnings to parenthood, which also contributes to the child
penalty. We find a substantial impact of parenthood for men in households with below
median earnings, whose earnings increase by about 20 percent. Childcare reduces this
increase by 8.4 percentage points. This is consistent with the idea that men have to make
up for lost earnings of their partner.5
The increase in female earnings and the decrease in male earnings cancel each other
out. The availability of childcare thus has no effect on total household earnings, but
increases the relative earning contribution by women by about 2.7 percentage points.
Furthermore, we are able to empirically study how the availability of childcare and
financial support for childcare costs interact with one another because some municipalities
in the canton of Bern introduce subsidies sometime after the opening of a childcare facility.
We find that the main part of the overall effect on the female child penalty is most likely
4We define households according to their pre-child earnings. Also, note that we define household
earnings as the combined earnings of both parents irrespective of whether they actually form a household.
5Note that part of the increase in male earnings is mechanical as it includes child benefits, which are
declared as part of their earnings.
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driven by subsidized childcare. There is only a slight effect of childcare without subsidies in
the three years following the birth of the first child with no longer term effect. Subsidized
childcare, however, reduces the child penalty by about 10 percent.
Our results render valuable insights to assessing the effectiveness of formal childcare
as a policy instrument. Generally, policy makers tend to provide childcare with two goals
in mind: First, they want to increase women’s labor market attachment, thus increasing
their economic independence and reducing the gender earnings gap. Second, they want to
increase the earnings potential of households at the bottom of the earnings distribution.
Our results suggest that childcare provision meets the first goal in lower earnings house-
holds. Childcare reduces the female child penalty of mothers below the median of the
households earnings distribution. A decrease in male earnings compared to a situation
with no childcare, however, counterbalances this increase in female earnings, resulting
in a zero effect on earnings at the household level. The finding that childcare reduces
the strain on fathers in lower-earnings households to compensate for at least part of the
earnings drop of their partner represents a desirable, though frequently ignored, side ef-
fect. Childbirth thus decreases household earnings by around 20 percent independently
of whether childcare is available or not, but reduces the gender earnings gap by reducing
the child penalty and increasing the female income share within the household.
We validate the interpretation of our findings by studying competing alternative mech-
anisms behind the effects. We show that i) the exploited treatment is effective in increasing
the take-up of childcare, ii) individuals do not change their fertility decision in anticipa-
tion of the introduction of childcare, that iii) selective mobility is unlikely to drive our
results, iv) the municipalities that open childcare facilities between 2001 and 2015 do not
systematically differ from other municipalities in the canton of Bern with respect to the
impact of children on female earnings, v) our results are not driven by differential time
trends in municipalities introducing childcare, and vi) our estimation approach does not
yield a significant effects in case of placebo introduction dates of childcare facilities. In
a final step, we briefly discuss the role of gender norms as a driving force of the child
penalty.
Our findings contribute to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the
growing literature on employment effects of parenthood (see, e.g. Angelov et al., 2016;
Bütikofer et al., 2018; Kleven et al., 2019a,b) and extend it by studying the differential
impact of childcare. Our findings are in line with the evidence provided by Olivetti
and Petrongolo (2017) that the institutional setting is crucial for the extent of the child
penalty.6
Second, our findings contribute to the large literature on the effect of childcare on
maternal employment in general. Most of the empirical evidence on the effects of childcare
availability on maternal labor outcomes focuses on the extensive margin. The evidence in
early work, reviewed by Blau (2003) and Blau and Currie (2006), is mixed. More recent
6We are aware of two ongoing projects (Girsberger et al., 2019; Bönke et al., 2019) which assess the
effect of parental leave policies on the child penalty.
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studies take the inherent endogeneity between childcare availability, childcare costs, and
maternal labor supply into account. While childcare could affect maternal employment,
employed mothers could also induce a higher demand for such services and drive its supply.
These studies exploit quasi-experimental settings to draw causal conclusions.
One line of studies exploits large childcare expansions with a simultaneous introduction
of childcare subsidies for mothers in general. Some of these studies find effects only for sub-
groups, such as single mothers (see Gelbach, 2002, and Cascio, 2009, for the US, and Goux
and Maurin, 2010, for France) or less skilled mothers (see Cascio and Schanzenbach, 2013,
for the US). Other studies find more substantial effects, documenting increases in mater-
nal participation rates and hours worked (see Lefebvre et al., 2009, Haeck et al., 2015, and
Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008, for Canada, Müller and Wrohlich, 2020, and Bauernschus-
ter and Schlotter, 2015, for Germany, and Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas, 2015, for
Spain). The heterogeneous findings in these prior studies might be explained by private
childcare arrangements, with a larger availability in the US or France than in Germany or
Spain. The differences described above may therefore reflect differences in take-up rates
related to the intervention, with the expansion of public childcare crowding out private
arrangements in the former case and increasing availability of childcare in the latter.
Another line of studies uses large increases in childcare subsidies, with no increase
in availability or take-up rates (see Givord and Marbot, 2015, for France, Lundin et al.,
2008, for Sweden, or Havnes and Mogstad, 2011, for Norway) and finds no or very modest
effects on mothers’ employment or earnings.
Importantly, the existing literature studies the impact of childcare independently of
the timing of the expansion with respect to the birth of the first child. We, in contrast,
argue that it is the access to childcare at this time which is particularly relevant. We
focus on the effect of childcare at the moment mothers make the decision to return to
work after the birth of their first child. In that, we combine the literature on employment
effects of parenthood and the effect of childcare on parental employment. Administrative
data on the whole population of the canton of Bern in Switzerland allow us to study both
the intensive and the extensive margin of mothers’ and fathers’ labor market decisions.
Over the years 2001-15, for which we have data, 59 of 401 municipalities in the canton
of Bern introduced childcare, whereas 26 already had childcare facilities before 2001.7
On top of this considerable expansion in childcare provision, we exploit the introduction
of subsidized care, which some municipalities only started offering several years after
the opening of a childcare facility. Though we have to rely on limited variation for this
analysis, it allows us to distinguish between an availability and a price effect and contribute
to the reconciliation of previous strands of literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our empirical
strategy, before Section 3 describes the data basis. Section 4 presents our results on the
7In 2001, around 18.5% of taxpayers in our data were living in municipalities that introduced childcare
between 2001-15, whereas 37% were living in municipalities, including the canton’s largest municipalities
Bern and Biel, which already had childcare before 2001.
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overall child penalty in Switzerland and on the differential impact of childcare availability.
Section 5 validates our estimation strategy and discusses the role of norms in the child
penalty, before Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Empirical strategy
We rely on an event study approach to investigate the effect of childcare on parents’ work
arrangements after the birth of their first child. We study how female and male earnings
and participation rates change after the birth of their first child and estimate differential
effects depending on whether there is access to childcare in the year of birth. We briefly
describe our baseline event study approach before we present the strategy to identify the
differential effect of childcare availability.
We build upon the event study approach proposed by Kleven et al. (2019a) to study
parental labor market outcomes after the birth of their first child conditional on pre-child
choices. In this setting, the birth year of the first child is denoted as event time t = 0
for each parent, and all prior and subsequent years are defined relative to this event. We
regress labor market outcomes on event time indicators and covariates using equation
Y gist =α +
j=6∑
j=−3
βgj × I[j = t] + γgage + δgs + μgmarried + νgi + ugist, (1)
where Y gist describes the labor market outcome of individual i of gender g in year s at event
time t. The event time parameters βgj , with β
g
−1 = 0, identify the change in outcomes
relative to the year prior to the birth of the first child, t = −1. We further add a full
set of age effects to control for life-cycle effects (γgage), year effects to control for any time
varying shocks (δgs), and individual fixed effects to control for time invariant individual
characteristics (νgi ).8 We further include an indicator variable for being married prior to
the birth of the first child (μgmarried).
In line with a recent contribution by Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2019), we apply
binning at both ends of our event time window. We keep individuals in years outside of
the range of our event time window, which runs from three years before to six years after
birth of the first child, in our sample. Outside this window, however, we bin the event
time dummies at -3 and 6. The event time estimate βg−j = β
g
−3 thus identifies the effect
for all t ≤ −3 and βgj = βg6 identifies the effect of t ≥ 6. Binning ensures the separate
identification of the event time indicators while flexibly controlling for age and time in
the presence of individual fixed effects.
We run the estimation in levels rather than in logs. This allows us to keep all indi-
viduals in our sample, even if their earnings drop to zero at some point. A non-negligible
fraction of women stops working for some time after the birth of the first child. To
8By construction, the individual specific effects also capture municipality of child birth fixed effects,
thus controlling for level differences between municipalities.
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convert the estimated earnings changes after the birth of the first child into percent-
age changes relative to the year before the birth of the first child, we divide the event
time estimates β̂gj by counterfactual earnings, i.e. predicted earnings in the absence of
a child at event time t. The percentage effect is thus defined as P̂ gt = β̂
g
j /E[Ŷ
g
ist|t] with
Ŷ gist = α̂ + γ̂
g
age + δ̂
g
s + μ̂
g
married. Due to this nonlinear transformation of the parameter
estimates, we apply a non-parametric bootstrap to get consistent standard errors for P̂ gt .
For identification, this event study approach relies on the assumption that average earn-
ings would develop smoothly in the absence of children, an idea which we rationalize in
the following framework.
In line with Kleven et al. (2019a), we assume that earnings Yit of individual i at time t
are a function of the number of children kit present at time t, the anticipated lifetime path
of fertility of individual i, denoted by ki = (0, ..., kit, kiT ), a set of earnings determinants
xit = x(kit,ki, zit) that depends on children and expected fertility, and zit, which is a set
of earnings determinants uncorrelated with children,
Yit = F (kit,xit, zit)
= F (kit, x[kit,ki, z(pit,pi)], z(pit,pi).
(2)
This framework allows for two effects of children on earnings. First, there is a pre-child
effect of future children given current children kit, which is, for instance, reflected in
individuals opting for less education or family friendly careers in anticipation of children.
The pre-child effect is already captured in the outcomes prior to the birth of the first
child, which are differenced out and cannot be identified. The post-child effect captures
the direct effect of current children kit on earnings, and the indirect effect of the birth
of a child through employment decisions, which is the indirect effect through earnings
decisions xit impacted by the birth of a child.
We assume that mean earnings develop smoothly in the absence of children. This
allows for the identification of the post-child effects in the event study. Introducing
controls for earnings determinants which are uncorrelated with children, zit, allows us
to relax the smoothness assumption. These direct controls for earnings determinants
include both an individual fixed effect pi, capturing characteristics such as ability or
education, and time varying determinants, like the age of an individual or time trends,
pit. Conditional on zit, the event study identifies the female and male child penalty even
in the long run. Contrary to the short run effect, the long run effect captures the effect of
total lifetime fertility instead of the effect of just the first child. In our setting, we include
a full set of age and year fixed effects, as well as individual fixed effects, which control for
a large part of zit. This basic approach allows us to estimate the overall effect of children
on parents’ earnings and labor force participation.
In addition to estimating the child penalty, we aim to identify the differential effect
depending on whether there is childcare provision in the municipality of residence in the
year of birth of the first child. To this end, we exploit the staggered introduction of child-
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care facilities across the municipalities in the canton of Bern.9 While the introduction
of childcare in a given municipality is likely endogenous to demand to some extent, we
assume that its precise timing is not. We validate this assumption by comparing child
penalties in municipalities opening a childcare facility in our observational window to
child penalties in municipalities which do not have a childcare facility by the end of the
time window we study. Our results show, that in the absence of childcare, their child
penalties are comparable. This alleviates the concern that individuals living in munici-
palities opening childcare facilities earlier systematically differ from individuals living in
municipalities with no childcare facilities. Furthermore, we focus on municipalities which
did not have childcare at the beginning of our sample period, but introduced it at some
point within our observational window.This strategy allows us to identify the effect of
childcare on the child penalty under the assumptions that individuals do not change their
fertility decisions in anticipation of the introduction of childcare, and that there is no
spatial selection of couples with a preference for continuing their employment at a high
level into municipalities offering childcare. We validate the robustness of our results with
respect to selective fertility and spatial selection in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
In order to study whether the overall child penalty depends on the availability of
childcare and to estimate the differential effect, we interact the event time dummies of
our baseline model with the indicator Carei, which assumes value 1 if there is a childcare
facility in the municipality of residence in the year of birth of the first child, and 0
otherwise. This results in the specification
Y gist = α +
6∑
j=−3
βgj I[j = t] +
∑
j =−1
ρgjI[j = t]× Carei
+ γgage + δ
g
s + μ
g
married + ν
g
i + u
g
ist,
(3)
where ρgj captures the difference in child penalties if in the year of birth of the first
child there is a childcare facility in the municipality of residence, and thus measures the
differential effect of childcare. The percentage effect is defined as ˆΔP gt = ρ̂
g
j/E[Ŷ
g
ist|t]. All
other variables are defined as above. As before, we use a non-parametric bootstrap to
calculate consistent standard errors.
3 Data
Individual data and sample
Our analysis draws on administrative tax data for the Swiss canton of Bern. With a pop-
ulation of about 1 million, the canton of Bern represents approximately one-eighth of the
total population of Switzerland and includes both urban centers and rural municipalities,
some of which are located in alpine regions. Around 11 percent of the population live in
9A federal impulse program provided financial support for the expansion in childcare facilities during
our sample period. Starting in 2003, the federal government provided funding to public and private
entities to cover the fixed costs of opening new facilities if they could document that there was sufficient
demand.
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municipalities that are French speaking, whereas in the majority of municipalities German
is the official language. This makes the canton of Bern a good mirror of Switzerland as
a whole. The tax data covers all individuals paying taxes in the canton of Bern, i.e., all
individuals who live in the canton of Bern on 31 December of a year and are aged 18 or
older.10
We draw on data for the years 2001 to 2015 and can track individuals over time as
long as they do not leave the canton. Even though Swiss law treats married couples as
one entity, the data allow us to distinguish between labor earnings contributed by each
spouse.11 We define the birth year of an individual’s first child as the year in which he
or she first files child deductions in their tax return.12 To identify the birth year of the
first child, we need to restrict our sample to parents who are married in at least one year
during our observational period.13 Relying on marriage allows us to identify both parents
under reasonable assumptions. This restriction is necessary because if parents are not
married, either of them can file for the deduction.14 While we do not require our panel
data to be balanced, we exclude individuals with missing information between the first
and the last year they appear in our data.15
In total, we identify 340,233 couples that are married at some point, associated with
4.07 million couple-year observations in our data. Restricting our sample to mixed sex
couples where both partners are aged 20 to 45 and who file child deductions in some year
results in 41,309 couples with 476,104 million couple-year observations. We further restrict
the sample to couples where neither spouse relocates in the year prior to or after the birth
of their first child, which we observe during at least five consecutive years between two
years before and two years after the birth of the first child, and where neither spouse
declares self-employed earnings.16 This renders a sample of 13,275 couples with 145,978
couple-year observations.
10Individuals under the age of 18 with considerable earnings also pay taxes. This is, however, quite
rare and, as explained below, we exclude individuals below the age of 20 from our sample.
11In the year a couple get married or divorced, e.g. there are multiple entries, one for the time period
the couple are taxed jointly and one for the time period they are taxed individually. In those cases, we
aggregate the entries to determine total earnings for that year.
12Note that this procedure does not allow us to distinguish between biological children and adoptions.
Using data from Denmark, however, research by Kleven et al. (2020) suggests that the child penalty is
the same for biological and adopted children.
13Given that at least 76 percent of individuals who have children in our sample are married at some
point, this is not a restrictive sample definition.
14We have separate identifiers for both spouses in couples, which the tax authority continues to use
before and after individuals are married. We exclude same-sex couples, who can also file their taxes
jointly. We also exclude individuals who were married to different spouses during our sample period
because this makes it harder to identify both parents.
15Observations for some years in between the first time an individual is observed and the final year
the individual is observed may be missing if an individual does not continuously live in the same canton.
Our data does not allow us to follow individuals across cantonal borders.
16Restricting to non-movers alleviates concerns of selective mobility. We discuss this point in more
detail in Section 5.3. We exclude couples with earnings from self-employment because tax considerations
might incentivize self-employed to shift earnings across years and between spouses.
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Since 2005, there have been 14 weeks of paid maternity leave in Switzerland . As bene-
fits received during maternity leave depend on pre-child earnings, the introduction of paid
maternity leave may not only affect outcomes after the birth of a child but potentially
also maternal earnings before giving birth. To avoid any bias induced by the introduction
of paid maternity leave, we further restrict the sample to parents of children born after
2004. Finally, we exclude all couples where either partner was not employed during the
three years before the birth of the first child. In the end, we are left with 10,372 couples
associated with 112,500 couple-year observations.
Municipality level childcare data
We complement the administrative individual data with self-collected information on the
availability of childcare in the municipality of residence.
In 2001, there were 401 municipalities in the canton of Bern. Provision of childcare
varies substantially across municipalities. The office of public education of the canton of
Bern (“Erziehungsdirektion Bern”) provided us with a list of daycare facilities for the year
2018. We then contacted each of these facilities via mail and/or phone individually to
inquire the year in which they opened and whether there were any comparable services
in the municipality before that date. The covered time span is marked by a considerable
expansion of childcare availability in Bern. While there were only 26 out of 401 munici-
palities (6.4% of municipalities, covering around 37% of the canton’s population) offering
childcare before 2001, there were 97 (24% of municipalities covering 71% of the canton’s
population) in 2015 (at the end of our sample). We managed to collect the opening year of
the first childcare facility for 59 of the 71 municipalities, which opened a childcare facility
between 2001 and 2015. These cover around 18.5% of the canton’s population.17 The
treatment year is defined as the year in which the first facility opened. Figure 1 visualizes
the location and the childcare opening year of these 59 municipalities within the canton
of Bern.
In the canton of Bern, there are both facilities with subsidized childcare places and
facilities without. The main distinction between the two is that facilities with subsidized
childcare places are subject to additional regulation concerning their pricing and prior-
itization of children.18 Prices for subsidized childcare are set at the cantonal level and
depend on parents’ income, wealth, and family size, with a minimum price of CHF 0.77
per hour and a maximum price of CHF 12.15 per hour in 2018.19 Additionally, for sub-
17In the remaining 12 municipalities, there was at least one facility which we were not able to reach
or that refused to communicate their opening year. As we are not able to define whether there was a
childcare facility at the time of birth of the first child, we exclude these municipalities from our sample.
18Regulations for facilities with subsidized care are available at
https://www.belex.sites.be.ch/frontend/versions/1620 and regulations for facilities with no subsi-
dized care at https://www.belex.sites.be.ch/frontend/versions/1223. This information is available in
German and French.
191 Swiss franc corresponded to $1.10 on August 6, 2020.
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Figure 1: Municipalities in Bern by opening year of their first childcare facility
(2013,2015]
(2011,2013]
(2009,2011]
(2007,2009]
(2005,2007]
(2003,2005]
[2001,2003]
No data
Note: This map visualizes the municipalities of the canton of Bern. The 59 municipalities
that opened their first childcare facility between 2001 and 2015 are marked in green. The
later the year in which the first childcare facility opened, the darker the color. “No data”
indicates municipalities that introduced childcare before 2001, after 2015, not yet at all,
or for which we were not able to determine the exact opening year.
sidized places, priority is given to families relying on two incomes and families requiring
childcare due to their social situation or for integrative purposes.20
Of the 10,372 couples in our restricted sample, there are 4,721 who, in the year of
birth of their first child, live in municipalities which either have no childcare facilities or
which have facilities but were not able to provide information on opening dates. Another
3,692 live in municipalities that offer childcare, but opened their facilities before 2001.
The exclusion of these cases leaves us with a sample of 1,959 couples, associated with
21,437 couple-year observations, who, in the year of birth of their first child, live in one
of the 59 municipalities opening a childcare facility between 2001 and 2015. Descriptive
statistics for this sample, as well as for the sample of couples living in municipalities
with no childcare facilities as of 2015 and for couples living in municipalities which open
a childcare facility before 2001, can be found in Appendix Table A.1. The samples are
comparable in both cases.
20A two parent family with one child, no wealth, and a net income of CHF 46,800 would pay the
minimum price. The price is decreasing in the number of children in the household and increasing in
family wealth and income. The maximum price is applicable to a two parent family with one child, no
wealth, and a net income of CHF 163,800.
11
Besides earnings, we also study the extensive margin of employment as an outcome.
We consider an individual to be employed if their earnings are positive in a given year.
4 Results
We present our empirical analysis in four steps. In a first step, we show how the birth
of a first child affects female and male earnings and participation rates. This allows us
to compare the size of the estimated penalty with previous studies. In a second step,
we turn to the impact of the presence of childcare in the year the first child is born on
parental earnings and participation rates. Here, we additionally evaluate the differential
impact of subsidized childcare vs. non-subsidized childcare. In a third step, we study the
heterogeneity of the effect depending on household earnings, and finally, we analyze the
overall effect on total household earnings and female earnings shares.
4.1 Assessing the child penalty
We start by estimating the earnings and participation effects of becoming a parent. As
described above, we condition our estimates on time fixed effects, life-cycle effects (age
effects), and individual fixed effects (see Equation 1 for more details). Figure 2 presents
the results for men and women and for our two main outcomes, individuals’ earnings
(total effect) and labor market participation (extensive margin).
Figure 2: Effect of parenthood on earnings and labor market participation
(a) Earnings
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Note: Percentage effect of parenthood on earnings and participation relative to the year
prior to the birth of the first child (t = −1) for women and men. Confidence bounds are
calculated applying a non-parametric bootstrap and are reported at the 5 percent level.
The corresponding estimates can be found in Appendix A, column (1) of Tables A.2
(earnings) and A.4 (participation) for women, and column (1) of Tables A.3 (earnings)
and A.5 (participation) for men.
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The left-hand panel of Figure 2 visualizes the effect of parenthood on earnings and
the right-hand panel on individuals’ labor market participation for both women and men.
Before the birth of their first child, earnings and participation patterns of men and women
evolve in parallel. After the birth of their first child, earnings diverge substantially. The
earnings of mothers drop by 62 percent between the year prior to childbirth and the year
after.21 The earnings of men, in contrast, display a slight increase of 5.4 percent in the
year after childbirth.22 Starting in year 2 after childbirth, the earnings of women and men
start evolving in a roughly parallel fashion again. Six years or more after childbirth, we
observe a decrease in women’s earnings of 69 percent and an increase in men’s earnings
of 6 percent, which add up to a total child penalty of 75 percent. The participation
rate of women initially drops by about 15 percent and by 21 percent in the long term.
About 30 percent of the drop in women’s earnings due to parenthood can be explained
by participation in the labor market. The participation rate of men, in contrast, remains
virtually unaffected by parenthood. It falls by about 4 percent. This is consistent with
studies for other countries.23
The earnings penalty we document for Swiss women is comparable to the one doc-
umented for Germany (for numbers on Germany and 5 other countries, see Kleven et
al., 2019b). However, while female participation rates in Germany are a major factor in
explaining the earnings gap, with a reduction of 40 percent six years after the birth of the
first child, female participation rates in Switzerland only decrease by 20 percent in the
long run and remain stable after year three following the birth of the first child.
4.2 The impact of childcare
We next turn to evaluating whether the availability of childcare facilities in the year the
first child is born impacts mothers’ (and fathers’) labor market attachment and helps
reduce the child penalty. As described above, we estimate a fully interacted event study
using an indicator set to one if there is childcare available in the year of birth of the first
child.
21In the year of birth (t = 0), earnings include maternity leave compensation, which corresponds to 80
percent of earnings in the year prior to the birth of the child (with a maximum of CHF 196) per day.
Paid maternity leave is 14 weeks. There is no paternity leave in Switzerland.
22This effect is to some extent mechanical. With the birth of the first child, employees receive child
benefits as part of their earnings. Child benefits are due to the parent with higher earnings, which is
usually the man. Statutory child benefits are approximately CHF 2,760 per child and year (rates may
vary slightly from year to year). Many employers grant additional benefits which are often of similar
magnitude for the first child, however, with the total amount of this additional benefit decreasing in the
number of children. For employees of the canton, e.g., the total annual child allowance for the first child
amounts to CHF 5,760, CHF 7,680 for two children, CHF 9,600 for three children, CHF 11,520 for four
children, and 2,760 times the number of children for five and more children. Considering that within
sample mean earnings of men at t = −1 are CHF 69,284, the child benefits for the first child correspond
to an increase in mean earnings of 8.3 percent.
23The effect of parenthood on women’s and men’s earnings is rather similar for the other subgroups of
municipalities, i.e., the municipalities that either open childcare facilities before 2001 or municipalities
with no childcare facilities as of 2015. These results are discussed in Section 5.4.
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Figure 3: Effect of having a childcare facility in the year of birth of the first child
Outcome: Earnings
(a) Effect of parenthood (b) Effect of childcare
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Outcome: Participation
(a) Effect of parenthood (b) Effect of childcare
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Note: These graphs show the effect of having a childcare facility in the municipality of
residence in the year of birth of the first child. Panels (a) show the percentage effect
of parenthood on earnings and the participation rate relative to the year prior to the
birth of the first child (t = −1) for women and men. Panels (b) display the difference
in female and male earnings by the presence of childcare (ρgj ). The confidence bounds
are calculated applying a non-parametric bootstrap and are displayed at the 5 percent
level. The corresponding estimates can be found in Appendix A, column (2) of Tables A.2
(earnings) and A.4 (participation) for women, and column (2) of Tables A.3 (earnings)
and A.5 (participation) for men.
The upper panel of Figure 3 shows the effect of the birth of the first child on earnings,
while the lower panel shows the effect on participation rates. As described before, we
consider municipalities opening their first childcare facility between 2001 and 2015. Our
strategy is to compare parents who had their first child after a childcare facility opened
with parents who had their first child before. Again, we see that before the birth of their
first child, the earnings of men and women evolve in parallel. Additionally, we see that
before the birth of the first child, earnings of women and men, who at the time of birth
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live in a municipality with childcare and individuals who do not, evolve in parallel. After
the birth of the first child, female earnings decrease by less if there is childcare compared
to if there is not. The right hand panel shows this difference more clearly by plotting
only the difference in the child penalties of individuals in municipalities with childcare
at the time of birth compared to individuals in municipalities without. In the long run,
female earnings are approximately 4.5 percentage points higher if there is childcare in
their municipality of residence in the year of birth of their first child. In other words,
childcare reduces the female child penalty by 6.3 percent. The difference is significant
at the 5 percent level. Male earnings are approximately 3.7 percentage points lower in
the long run if there is childcare in their municipality of residence in the year of birth of
their first child. This result is intuitive given that, with the positive effect of childcare
on female earnings, men do not have to increase their earnings by the same amount after
the birth a child to, at least partly, make up for lost partner earnings. This difference is
significant at the 10 percent level.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 reveals that childcare does not affect men’s labor market
participation. In the short run, there is no clear effect on female labor market participation
either. Though less precisely estimated, there is a long term effect. The presence of
childcare at the time of birth increases female participation by 5.1 percentage points six
or more years after childbirth, corresponding to a 22 percent reduction in the drop of
labor market participation for women we observe after the birth of the first child. This
implies that participation fully accounts for the effect of childcare on the female child
penalty when a woman’s first child is in school. In the year of birth itself, as well as
in the five subsequent years, however, the effect on participation is never statistically
significant and the point estimate is mostly smaller than the point estimate on the total
effect. This suggests that childcare allows mothers of young children to increase their
workload through part-time work arrangements, which are common in Switzerland.
The role of subsidized childcare
The above results indicate that the presence of childcare increases earnings of women
after the birth of the first child (reduces the child penalty). This raises the question
whether the increase is driven by a pure availability effect or whether it is driven by
a price effect. Subsidized childcare creates an incentive to substitute away from home
care or more expensive private arrangements and to paid employment. In order to study
this mechanism, we gather information on whether there is subsidized childcare in the
municipality. Subsidies depend on parental income and can reduce hourly prices by more
than 90 percent.
We are able to distinguish between the introduction of non-subsidized and subsidized
care because 11 of the 59 municipalities which introduced childcare started offering finan-
cial support on average 4.5 years later. 353 of the 1,959 couples in our sample live in those
11 municipalities. In order to estimate the differential impact, we, technically, include an
15
Figure 4: Effect of having subsidized childcare in the year of birth of the first child
for women
(a) Effect of parenthood
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Note: Effect of having a childcare facility in the municipality of residence in the year
of birth of the first child, distinguishing between subsidized and non-subsidized care.
Panel (a) shows the percentage effect of parenthood on earnings relative to the year prior
to the birth of the first child (t = −1) for women. Panel (b) displays the estimated
effect of childcare on the child penalty for women. The solid line displays the effect
for non-subsidized care and the dashed line for subsidized care. Confidence bounds are
calculated applying a non-parametric bootstrap and are displayed at the 5 percent level.
The corresponding estimates can be found in column (5) of Table A.2 in Appendix A. The
corresponding estimates for men can be found in column (5) of Table A.3 in Appendix A.
additional term in our estimation equation. We interact the event time dummies with a
childcare indicator and an indicator for whether childcare is subsidized, as described in
Equation 3. The left hand side of Figure 4 presents how female earnings change after the
birth of the first child. We distinguish between mothers living in a municipality with no
childcare at the time of birth of their first child, mothers living in a municipality with
childcare but no subsidies, and mothers in a municipality with subsidized childcare. The
right hand side shows the differences between no childcare and non-subsidized childcare
(solid), and no childcare and subsidized childcare (dashed).
While these results are based on rather few observations in municipalities switching
from non-subsidized to subsidized childcare, the results indicate that financial support am-
plifies the abating effect of childcare on the child penalty. The introduction of subsidized
childcare increases maternal earnings by 7.8 percentage points compared to no childcare,
which is displayed by the dashed line, or by one-tenth of the total penalty of mothers
in municipalities without childcare. The effect of childcare without financial support is
still positive, albeit small and not significantly different from no childcare, as shown by
the solid line in the right panel of Figure 4. We do not find a differential effect for par-
ticipation rates. The corresponding results can be found in column (5) Appendix Table
A.4. These results suggest that subsidies play a complementary role in childcare provision
and without subsidies, reductions in the child penalty may be considerably smaller. The
16
Figure 5: Effect of childcare for women by pre-child household earnings.
Outcome: Household earnings below sample median at t=-1
(a) Effect of parenthood (b) Effect of childcare
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Outcome: Household earnings above sample median at t=-1
(a) Effect of parenthood (b) Effect of childcare
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Note: Effect of having a childcare facilities in the municipality of residence in the year
of birth of the first child on female earnings, by pre-child household earnings. The top
panels show the effect for households with pre-child earnings below the sample median,
the bottom panels for households with pre-child earnings above the sample median. The
panels on the left show the percentage effect of parenthood on female earnings relative
to the year prior to the birth of the first child (t = −1). The panels on the right display
the effect estimates of childcare. Confidence bounds are calculated at the 5 percent level
of significance applying a non-parametric bootstrap. The corresponding estimates can
be found in column (3) and column (4) of Table A.2 in Appendix A. The corresponding
estimates for men can be found in column (3) and column (4) of Table A.3 in Appendix A.
corresponding results for men also suggest that the childcare effect is driven by subsidized
care (see column (5) Appendix Table A.5).
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Heterogeneity by household earnings
Given the importance of subsidized childcare, one might expect to see a stronger effect
for families with lower earnings (household earnings below or equal to sample median at
t = −1) than for families with higher earnings (household earnings above sample median
at t = −1). Figure 5 shows the estimates of the female child penalty and the effect
of childcare for families with pre-child earnings below the sample median and families
with pre-child earnings above the sample median. Panels (a) show that the long-term
child penalty for women is comparable for both groups (around 70 percent of earnings).
Panels (b) visualize the estimated effect of childcare for women by earnings group. In
the presence of childcare, long-term maternal earnings are approximately 11.2 percentage
points higher in lower-earnings families. Childcare thus reduces the female child penalty
in lower-earnings families by about 15 percent. As shown in Appendix Table A.3, the
documented increase in male earnings after the birth of the first child is also purely
driven by lower-earnings households. In the absence of childcare, earnings of men in
lower-earnings households increase by about 20 percent. Childcare reduces this increase
in earnings of men in lower-earnings families by about 8.4 percentage points or by 38
percent, suggesting that childcare reduces the burden on men in lower-earnings families
to make up for a loss in female earnings. The effect of childcare among higher-earnings
families is negligible for both women and men, and not statistically significant in most
event time periods.
The results for the labor force participation are in line with these findings. We find
a somewhat less precisely estimated but positive long term impact for women lower-
earnings households and no effect for higher-earnings households. The increase in the
long term participation rate for lower-earnings households amounts to a substantial (37
percent) reduction in the participation drop in the absence of childcare. The corresponding
estimates can be found in column (3) and column (4) of Table A.2 in Appendix A. The
corresponding estimates for men can be found in column (3) and column (4) of Table A.3
in Appendix A.
Our results confirm that the effect of childcare is indeed stronger among lower-earnings
families than among higher-earnings families. The effects on mothers’ and fathers’ earn-
ings add up to a reduction of the total child penalty in lower-earning families by 20
percent.
Childcare and earnings at the household level
One policy goal of introducing childcare might be to reduce the drop in household earnings
associated with the birth of a first child. As shown above, the presence of childcare at
the time of birth of the first child increases female earnings and decreases male earnings
compared to a scenario with no childcare. Both of these effects contribute to a reduction
in the child penalty defined as the child-induced increase in the gender pay gap. If and
how these two effects impact total household earnings, is a priori unclear.
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Figure 6: Effect of childcare on household earnings and the female earnings share
Outcome: Household earnings
Parenthood and household earnings Effect of childcare on household earnings
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Outcome: Female earnings share
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Note: This analysis follows a similar specification as the analyses in Figures 3 and 5, but
with couple’s total labor earnings and the female earnings share as dependent variable.
Effect of having a childcare facilities in the municipality of residence in the year of birth
of the first child. The top panels show the effect on household income, the bottom panels
the effect on the female earnings share. The panels on the left show the percentage
effect of parenthood relative to the year prior to the birth of the first child (t = −1).
The panels on the right display the differential effect of childcare on household earnings
and the female earnings share respectively. The corresponding estimates can be found in
Tables A.6 and A.7 respectively. Confidence bounds are calculated at the 5 percent level
of significance applying a non-parametric bootstrap.
We present results on the development of total household earnings around the birth
of the first child in the first row of Figure 6. On average, household earnings drop by
more than 20 percent relative to the year before the child is born. We find no evidence
for a systematic impact of childcare availability on total household earnings. While the
effect of childcare is somewhat positive in the lower-earnings sample, it is small and not
statistically significant at conventional levels (see Appendix Table A.6). The second row
in Figure 6 shows the result of running an event study on female earnings shares as
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the dependent variable. We find that with childcare women’s contribution to household
earnings increases by 2.7 percentage points on average. The increase is more distinct in
lower-earnings households where it amounts to 5.1 percentage points (see Table A.7 in
the Appendix). This leads to the conclusion that while availability of childcare impacts
relative earnings within the household, with women earning more and men earning less
than in the absence of childcare, it does not impact overall earnings. This finding might
of course be specific to high income countries like Switzerland.
5 Discussion
The results in Section 4 provide evidence for a positive impact of childcare on female
earnings. In what follows, we explore a number of alternative mechanisms that could
potentially bias our results. In these robustness checks, we mainly focus on the impact
of childcare on the child penalty of women. We validate that i) the exploited treatment
is effective in increasing take-up of childcare, ii) individuals do not change their fertility
decision in anticipation of the introduction of childcare, iii) selective mobility is unlikely
to drive our results, iv) municipalities opening childcare facilities between 2001 and 2015
do not systematically differ from other municipalities in the canton of Bern with respect
to the impact of children on female earnings, v) our results are not driven by differential
time trends in municipalities introducing childcare, and vi) our estimation approach does
not yield a significant effect in case of placebo introduction dates of childcare facilities.
In a final step, we briefly discuss the role of gender norms as a driving force of the child
penalty.
5.1 Take-up
If our treatment indeed captures the increased availability of childcare, it should also
affect take-up rates. While we cannot directly observe whether individuals in our sample
have children enrolled in the facilities under consideration, the tax data include a variable
on tax deductions for formal childcare arrangements. This provides us with information
on whether parents make use of any kind of formal childcare. If our findings are driven by
increased availability, we should observe an increase in tax deductions filed for childcare
in the municipalities which open a childcare facility.24 While one might expect that the
opening of childcare facilities induces some substitution away from privately organized
care, overall we expect to see an increase in the claims of childcare deductions as there
likely are households that previously could not afford childcare.
24We are not able to distinguish between types of childcare, namely whether it is claimed for care
by nannies, by in-home daycare providers, or for institutional childcare. Nevertheless, if the effect on
parental earnings is driven by the increase in childcare availability, we should see an increase in take-up
rates of affected parents relative to parent who in the year of birth of their first child live in a municipality
without childcare.
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Figure 7: Effect of childcare on take-up
Outcome: Childcare deductions in CHF
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Outcome: Extensive margin
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Note: Effect of having a childcare facility in the municipality of residence in the year
of birth of the first child on childcare take-up. The top panels display the effect on the
amount of total childcare deductions filed in CHF. The bottom panels display the effect
on the extensive margin (whether any childcare deductions are filed). The panels on the
left show how filings for childcare deductions evolve by availability and event time starting
with the year of birth (t = 0). The panels on the right display the difference in take-
up between individuals in municipalities with and without childcare. The corresponding
estimation results can be found in Table A.8 in the Appendix.
To verify that take-up does indeed increase, we estimate an event study model where
we compare filings for childcare deductions of couples who, in the year of birth of their
first child, live in a municipality with and without childcare. We use two outcomes. The
first outcome is the total amount deducted for childcare.25 The second outcome is an
indicator variable set to one if a household files any childcare deductions, capturing the
25Note that this likely presents a lower bound. There is an upper bound on filings for childcare
deductions per child and year of CHF 1,500 until 2008, CHF 3,000 in 2009 and 2010, and CHF 3,100
from 2011 onward. Average childcare deductions filed are CHF 2,672.
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extensive margin. Our analysis of take-up is restricted in that we cannot compare pre-
trends because filings for childcare deductions are naturally zero before the birth of the
first child.
The upper panel of Figure 7 shows that parents’ filings for childcare deductions in
municipalities with childcare at the time of the birth of the first child exceed filings of
parents in municipalities without childcare six years after the first child by, on average,
CHF 413, or 28 percent. The positive differential materializes already in the first year after
childbirth and increases thereafter. While there is no immediate effect at the extensive
margin. Six years after the birth of their first child, parents in municipalities with childcare
are 9.4 percentage points more likely to file childcare deductions.
These findings suggest that the exploited treatment indeed increases childcare take-up.
It is, however, likely that we measure a lower bound in this analysis as there likely is some
substitution between private and institutional care.
5.2 Selective fertility
One potential source of bias is selective or delayed fertility. If the woman is more attached
to the labor market, couples might, for example, wait to have a child until there is childcare
in their municipality of residence. If selective fertility were an issue, we would expect to
observe an increase in fertility after the opening of a childcare facility. We run an event
study on the probability of child birth around the opening of a childcare facility to test
whether such selective fertility is a concern. In this analysis, the event time does not
relate to the birth year of a first child, but to the year in which a childcare facility opens
in the respective municipality. Similar to the above analyses, we include all individuals
aged 20-45 who live in a municipality which introduced childcare during the years 2001-
2015. This time, however, we do not restrict ourselves to individuals who necessarily have
children at some point as the dependent variable is an indicator for whether an individual
has a child in the respective year.
We find no indication for a change in fertility after the opening of a childcare facility, as
shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.26 Selective fertility consequently appears unlikely
to bias our results.
5.3 Selective mobility
Selective mobility is another potential source of bias. If parents with a strong preference
to continue formal employment are more likely to move to municipalities with childcare
around the birth of their first child, the effect we observe could, at least partially, be
driven by changes in population characteristics. Individuals who selectively move to
municipalities opening a childcare facility could also be more likely to remain in formal
26Appendix Table A.9 also shows estimates for an alternative difference-in-differences specification,
which includes individuals in municipalities that did not have childcare by 2015 as a control group. Again,
we do not find any indication that the introduction of childcare had an impact on fertility decisions.
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employment. In this case we would overestimate the impact of childcare on earnings and
employment.
Figure 8: Effect of childcare for women who do not move between t = −2 and t = 2
(a) Effect of parenthood (b) Effect of childcare
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Note: Percentage effect of parenthood on female earnings relative to the year prior to
the birth of the first child (t = −1). The sample is restricted to individuals living in the
same municipality between t = −2 and t = 2. Confidence bounds are calculated at the 5
percent level applying a non-parametric bootstrap. The corresponding estimates can be
found in column (1) of Table A.10 in Appendix A.
For our main estimation sample, we only consider individuals who remain in the same
municipality during the year prior to and the year after birth. To check for the robustness
of our findings, we now restrict the sample to individuals staying in the same municipality
during the two years prior to and two years after the birth of their first child, i.e., we only
use individuals who stay in the same municipality before pregnancy and for longer after
the birth of the child. This should exclude couples which have selectively moved to the
municipality. This restriction reduces our sample by about 25 percent. If these excluded
couples were to drive our effect, the reduced sample should show a weaker or no impact
of childcare.
Figure 8 (b) presents results of the differential effect of childcare based on this re-
stricted sample of ‘long-term’ stayers. If anything, the results show a slightly stronger
effect of the introduction of childcare on mothers’ earnings. While the raw female child
penalty without childcare is comparable among the original and the stayer sample, we find
that the introduction of childcare reduces the adverse impact of parenthood on female
earnings of long-term stayers by about 5.4 percentage points compared to a reduction of
4.5 percentage points in the main sample. Again, the effect seems to be driven by subsi-
dized childcare (see columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table A.10). The results for men
are hardly affected (see column (1) and (2) of Appendix Table A.11). We conclude, that
selective moving behavior is unlikely to bias our results. If anything, the introduction of
childcare seems to affect the existing resident population more.
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5.4 External validity
For our main results, we only use the sample of municipalities within the canton of Bern
which open a childcare facility between 2001 and 2015. So far, we have excluded all
municipalities that either introduce childcare before 2001 or which have not introduced
childcare facilities by the end of 2015. The sample of municipalities with no childcare
by the end of 2015 can be used to test whether individuals who live in municipalities
introducing childcare show different earnings patterns around the birth of a child than
those in our main sample. Such differences might point to a systematic selection of the
population in municipalities introducing childcare. Such selection might be a threat to
the external validity of our results.
To test whether our results are likely to generalize, we test whether individuals residing
in municipalities introducing childcare between 2001 and 2015 show similar child penalties
in the years before the introduction of childcare as individuals in municipalities which have
not introduced childcare by the end of 2015. To this end, we introduce an interaction
term with an indicator (care = 1) set to one for municipalities which introduce childcare
at some point. Using only years before the introduction of childcare, this comparison
allows us to test whether the child penalty differs systematically between the two types
of municipalities. If they are comparable before the introduction of childcare, it might be
valid to expect that they would also be comparable in their response to the introduction
of childcare.
We find no evidence that female earnings evolve differently around the birth of a
first child in the two types of municipalities, as shown in Appendix Figure A.2. Mothers’
earnings decrease by about 60 percent in the year of birth and the following year. Earnings
patterns of individuals living in municipalities which do not have a childcare facility by
the year 2015 and municipalities where a childcare facility opened between 2001 and 2015
do not differ before the opening of the childcare facility. We interpret this as evidence
that our results likely generalize to other municipalities.
5.5 Differential time trends of municipalities introducing child-
care
We have shown that there is no systematic difference in the child penalty between mu-
nicipalities which introduce childcare at some point and municipalities which do not.
Furthermore, based on pre-trends, we have shown that individuals who, in the birth year
of their first child, live in a municipality with childcare do not differ from individuals
who do not. In a last step, we now want to make sure that the results are not driven by
differing time trends of municipalities opening a childcare facility compared to municipal-
ities with no childcare facility. To do that, we only use parents of children who are born
within a narrow window around the introduction of childcare facilities, i.e., three years
around the opening of a childcare facility. As these children were born “narrowly” before
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Figure 9: Effect of childcare for women and births within three years around
facility opening
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Note: Percentage effect of parenthood on female earnings relative to the year prior to the
birth of the first child (t = −1) using only individuals whose first child is born within 3
years around the opening of the childcare facility. Confidence bounds are calculated at
the 5 percent level applying a non-parametric bootstrap. The corresponding estimates
can be found in column (4) of Table A.10 in Appendix A.
and after the introduction, it is less likely that any difference is driven by,for example, an
attitudinal change brought about by the introduction.
The restriction to children born within three years around the opening of a childcare
facility reduces the sample by about 50 percent. This is reflected in the larger confidence
bands in Figure 9. Still, we see that childcare decreases the child penalty of women by
about 7 percentage points. The effect is significant at the 5 percent level for most event
time periods. More importantly, the effect is of similar magnitude as the one in our main
sample.
5.6 Placebo test
We perform a placebo test to address concerns that we may not capture the effect of
childcare introductions but some trend, or that our fixed effects strategy may not be
able to control for potential confounders. The placebo test confirms that our estimation
approach does not lead to significant estimates when no effect should exist, i.e., when no
childcare has been introduced. We use the sample of individuals living in municipalities
which do not have childcare facilities by the end of 2015 and randomly assign a childcare
facility-opening year between 2001 and 2015 to each of the municipalities assuming a
uniform distribution. We then apply Equation 3 to measure the effect of these placebo
childcare facilities. Figure 10 displays the average result for 1,000 replications of the
random assignment of opening dates.
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Figure 10: Placebo estimates of childcare for women
(a) Placebo estimates of parenthood
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Note: Placebo effect of childcare. Percentage effect of parenthood on female earnings
relative to the year prior to the birth of the first child (t = −1) using only municipalities
which do not have childcare facilities by the end of 2015 and randomly assigning opening
dates for childcare facilities. Confidence bounds are drawn from the distributions of the
placebo event time estimates. The corresponding estimates can be found in Figure A.3
in Appendix A.
We find no statistically significant difference between parents who, in the year of birth
of their first child, live in a municipality randomly assigned with a childcare facility and
parents living in a municipality without. This is clearly visible in panel (b) where we
display the differential effect. The distributions of each of the event time estimates based
on this random assignment is visualized in Figures A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix. In these
graphs, we also compare the distribution of the placebo estimates to the point estimates
in the upper right panel of Figure 3.
5.7 Female breadwinners and the child penalty
While we can show that the presence of childcare helps decrease the child penalty and
increases female earnings shares, there is still a steep drop in female earnings after the
birth of their first child, while male earnings show a slight increase. There are several
arguments as to what drives the child penalty for women and why women’s earnings
respond more strongly than those of men. In this study, we demonstrate that formal
institutions are an important determinant of the child penalty. While our findings suggest
that childcare reduces the child penalty, childcare availability does in no way eliminate it.
The large remaining (unexplained) drop in female earnings after childbirth leaves room
for additional explanations.
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One popular argument is that the child penalty may emerge endogenously on efficiency
grounds.27 Assuming that, typically, at least one parent needs to reduce labor supply to
take care of the child and given that men earn more, on average, it may seem reasonable
that the woman reduces her work hours in order to maximize household income given the
constraint.
The efficiency argument can be put to a test by analyzing the child penalty depending
on the female earnings share within a household. If the efficiency argument were to hold,
households where the woman outearns her partner prior to the birth of their first child
(female breadwinner) would show a smaller female child penalty than households where
the man outearns the woman (male breadwinner). Appendix Figure A.5 and Table A.12
show a comparison of child penalties in couples with a female vs. couples with a male
breadwinner. In the baseline specification, we define the breadwinner as the person who
earns at least 50 percent of household earnings in the year before the birth of the first
child.28 Overall, slightly more than one fifth of all couples have a female breadwinner.
We find that the child penalty for women in female-breadwinner couples is virtually
indistinguishable from that of women in male-breadwinner couples. Except for the year
of the child’s birth itself, in which the female child penalty is slightly smaller if the
woman was the breadwinner, there is no statistically significant difference between child
penalties of women who were breadwinners and women who were not. The earnings of
men, however, increase slightly more after the birth of the first child if their spouse was
the breadwinner in the year before their child was born. This is consistent with the idea
that he has to make up for a larger earnings drop.29 The results remain unchanged if we
apply an alternative definition of the breadwinner of at least 60 percent of a couple’s total
earnings.
These findings suggest that gender norms play an important role in the explanation of
the large part of the child penalty unaffected by childcare institutions. This is consistent
with Kleven et al. (2019b), who present evidence showing a correlation between the child
penalty and gender norms. If gender norms are a major driver of the child penalty, then
we would not expect relative earnings contributions within the household to be related to
the child penalty.
27One further argument is that biological costs related to child bearing might drive part of the earnings
drop. Recent work by Kleven et al. (2020), however, finds no evidence for differences in child penalties
between biological and adopted children.
28In order to achieve a reasonable sample size for this additional analysis, we use all couples in our data
in this analysis. We do not restrict the sample to those municipalities that opened childcare facilities
between years 2001 and 2015.
29Note that the earnings of both women and men increase more steeply in the pre-birth period than
earnings of non-breadwinners. Such slight pre-trends also appear in studies for other countries, see e.g.
Kleven et al. (2019a) and Bütikofer et al. (2018). They probably reflect that for some groups, especially
well educated individuals, earnings increase steeply in the 3 to 5 years before the birth of their first child,
which usually coincides with the end of their education and subsequent employment. This is also reflected
by the fact that we see the largest increases in pre-child earnings for higher-earnings families and that
they are more pronounced for women. For lower-earnings families, many of whom probably finished their
education longer before having a child, year and age effects are able to fully capture earnings trajectories,
as seen in column (4) of Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3.
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6 Conclusion
We study the impact of the provision of formal childcare, one of the most widely used
family policies to increase women’s labor market attachment. We propose that childcare
availability in the year the first child is born is particularly relevant for the development
of parental earnings trajectories. We leverage the recently proposed event study approach
estimating the effect of a first child on parents’ labor market outcomes, the child penalty,
to evaluate the differential effect of the availability of formal childcare.
Our empirical study draws on administrative data for the canton of Bern, one of the
largest Swiss cantons. Bern is particularly interesting as it underwent a considerable
expansion in the availability of formal childcare at the municipality level, from 6.4 to 24.2
percent of municipalities, between 2001 and 2015. We find that the observed child penalty
in earnings for mothers, which amounts to about 70 percent, is comparable to estimates
found for other countries. The introduction of childcare reduces the child penalty for
women by about 4.5 percentage points (by 6.3 percent). This effect is primarily driven
by an even stronger reduction in the child penalty of women in lower-earnings households
(11.2 percentage points or 15.1 percent), and by subsidized childcare.
In line with previous literature, we find that men’s earnings respond much less to
the birth of the first child than women’s earnings. However, we find that while male
earnings generally increase after the birth of their first child, the increase is lower in
the presence of childcare. This effect is particularly relevant for households in the lower
part of the earnings distribution. This result suggests that the burden for men to make
up for the drop in their partner’s earnings is considerable in lower-earnings households.
The availability of childcare seems to reduce this burden on fathers in lower-earnings
households. It attenuates the increase in their earnings by 8.4 percentage points.
Our results contribute to the growing literature on the effect of children on parents’
earnings trajectories and expand it by rendering causal estimates of childcare on parents
labor market outcomes in an early phase of parenthood, just after the birth of a child.
While the availability of childcare increases the labor market attachment of (especially
lower-earnings) mothers, and thus the distribution of earnings within a household, we do
not find an impact on total earnings at the household level. Childcare does not reduce the
drop in total household earnings (of about 20 percent) related to the birth of the first child,
but the composition of earnings between mothers and fathers. According to our findings
for Switzerland, formal childcare does not seem to be a policy tool which could improve
total earnings at the household level. However, it seems to be effective in increasing the
labor market attachment of mothers, which is a second frequently mentioned goal of formal
childcare. In addition, childcare reduces the burden on new fathers in households with
below median earnings who otherwise have to make up for the drop in female earnings.
This constitutes relaxing effect on a so far ignored but potentially important stress factor.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Main sample: childcare Intro post 2015 Intro pre 2001 Intro undeterm.
Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Δ mean p-val Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Earnings women (t=-1) 51,113 21,188 0 232,005 51,077 18,941 36 0.95 51,490 23,501 53,595 23,123
Earnings men (t=-1) 69,601 27,342 0 330,532 67,613 24,123 1,987 0.01 69,107 31,619 73,263 35,232
Age women (t=-1) 29.43 4.10 21 42 29.54 4.10 -0.11 0.35 29.87 4.10 30.05 4.10
Age men (t=-1) 31.95 4.43 21 42 32.11 4.42 -0.16 0.22 32.16 4.45 32.27 4.34
Married (t=-1) 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.71 0.45 -0.00 0.90 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46
Number of children (t=3) 1.74 0.51 1 4 1.75 0.51 -0.01 0.74 1.68 0.53 1.67 0.53
Number of children (t=5) 2.00 0.58 1 4 1.99 0.60 0.00 0.88 1.94 0.59 1.92 0.59
N couples 1,959 3,020 3,692 1,701
Notes: The left-hand panel displays information for couples from our main analysis who live in municipalities that introduce
childcare between 2001 and 2015. The middle panel displays corresponding figures for couples in municipalities which did
not have childcare by the end of 2015. The right-hand panel displays the figures for couples in municipalities which opened
a childcare facility before 2001. Earnings are in Swiss francs.
Table A.1 shows descriptive statistics. Men’s earnings in the year before they have their
first child are higher, on average, than those of their female partners.30 They are, however,
on average also more than 2.5 years older in that year. 71 percent of couples in our analysis
are married in the year before childbirth. The number of children increases to on average
1.74 three years after birth of the first child, and to 2 children five years after. The
central panel displays corresponding numbers for couples living in municipalities which
did not have childcare by the end of 2015. We use those for placebo tests. The summary
statistics are hardly distinguishable for the two groups. Only mean male earnings differ
significantly between the two groups with a t-statistic of 2.69.
The third panel shows summary statistics for couples who had their first child in
municipalities which introduced institutional childcare already before 2001. These mu-
nicipalities include the urban centers of Bern and Biel. The fourth panel, finally, shows
descriptive statistics for couples in municipalities for which we were not able to deter-
mine the date of childcare introduction. We do not use observations from the latter two
groups in any part of our analysis. Mean numbers for most non-monetary characteristics
of these groups differ significantly from the means in our main sample. Earnings tend to
be slightly higher among couples in municipalities with childcare before 2001 or with an
undetermined year of introduction. As one might expect, couples in more urban areas
tend to be slightly older and less likely to be married in the year before the birth of their
first child. They also tend to have fewer children 3 and 5 years after the birth of their
first child.
30Earnings are displayed in Swiss francs. 1 Swiss franc corresponded to $1.10 on August 6, 2020.
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Table A.2: Earnings penalty, women
Overall Childcare Childcare & Childcare & Subsidized
Hh inc.>p50 Hh inc.≤p50 childcare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Event −3 -0.015 -0.016 -0.041** 0.016 -0.020
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.031) (0.018)
Event −2 -0.013* -0.008 -0.022* 0.018 -0.010
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009)
Event 0 -0.243*** -0.259*** -0.226*** -0.304*** -0.261***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011)
Event +1 -0.620*** -0.642*** -0.623*** -0.681*** -0.653***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
Event +2 -0.641*** -0.661*** -0.653*** -0.686*** -0.671***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
Event +3 -0.672*** -0.687*** -0.676*** -0.718*** -0.694***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013)
Event +4 -0.684*** -0.701*** -0.686*** -0.734*** -0.706***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.014)
Event +5 -0.691*** -0.707*** -0.687*** -0.747*** -0.714***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015)
Event +6 -0.692*** -0.714*** -0.702*** -0.744*** -0.718***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.017)
Event −3· care 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.030) (0.033)
Event −2· care -0.007 0.001 -0.021 0.000
(0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016)
Event 0· care 0.026** 0.028* 0.029* 0.043*
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023)
Event +1· care 0.038** 0.030* 0.067*** 0.013
(0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.035)
Event +2· care 0.035** 0.024 0.074*** 0.018
(0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.034)
Event +3· care 0.026 0.009 0.086*** 0.001
(0.016) (0.019) (0.026) (0.036)
Event +4· care 0.031* 0.008 0.099*** 0.013
(0.017) (0.020) (0.028) (0.038)
Event +5· care 0.032* 0.002 0.105*** 0.026
(0.019) (0.022) (0.031) (0.042)
Event +6· care 0.045** 0.019 0.112*** 0.022
(0.023) (0.026) (0.034) (0.039)
Event −3· subs. care 0.018
(0.016)
Event −2· subs. care -0.002
(0.011)
Event 0· subs. care 0.028**
(0.012)
Event +1· subs. care 0.050***
(0.016)
Event +2· subs. care 0.045***
(0.016)
Event +3· subs. care 0.034**
(0.017)
Event +4· subs. care 0.040**
(0.018)
Event +5· subs. care 0.042**
(0.020)
Event +6· subs. care 0.056**
(0.024)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N indiv. 1959 1959 1001 958 1767
N 21437 21437 11194 10243 19359
Notes: Event study estimates of female earnings relative to the year prior to the birth of their first
child. The interaction terms with childcare (care) indicate the differential effect if at the birth of the
first child, there are childcare facilities in the municipality of residence. The interaction terms with
subsidized childcare (subs. care) indicate the difference if at the birth of the first child, there are subsidized
childcare facilities in the municipality of residence compared to if there is no childcare. Standard errors
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) as the estimates of earnings changes are transformed into percentage
changes after the estimation by dividing the estimates by ˆearnings, i.e. predicted earnings when setting
event time dummies to zero.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Earnings penalty, men
Overall Childcare Childcare & Childcare & Subsidized
Hh inc.>p50 Hh inc.≤p50 childcare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Event −3 -0.018 -0.020 -0.051** 0.027 -0.013
(0.015) (0.018) (0.021) (0.029) (0.019)
Event −2 -0.012* -0.012 -0.022* -0.001 -0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010)
Event 0 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.011 0.096*** 0.046***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.011)
Event +1 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.020 0.129*** 0.062***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.025) (0.015)
Event +2 0.054*** 0.068*** 0.021 0.136*** 0.062***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.029) (0.017)
Event +3 0.073*** 0.087*** 0.027 0.183*** 0.081***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.036) (0.021)
Event +4 0.069*** 0.077*** 0.008 0.191*** 0.073***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.040) (0.024)
Event +5 0.065*** 0.082*** 0.017 0.194*** 0.075***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.042) (0.026)
Event +6 0.057** 0.076*** 0.001 0.215*** 0.069**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.034) (0.051) (0.030)
Event −3· care -0.001 0.017 -0.017 0.010
(0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.028)
Event −2· care -0.001 -0.003 0.007 0.011
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018)
Event 0· care -0.007 -0.003 -0.012 -0.018
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019)
Event +1· care -0.019* -0.021 -0.017 -0.017
(0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.025)
Event +2· care -0.022* -0.022 -0.024 -0.014
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.030)
Event +3· care -0.024* -0.017 -0.044* -0.014
(0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (0.023)
Event +4· care -0.013 -0.009 -0.025 -0.006
(0.016) (0.018) (0.028) (0.029)
Event +5· care -0.031* -0.035* -0.030 -0.021
(0.018) (0.021) (0.030) (0.034)
Event +6· care -0.037* -0.017 -0.084** -0.067*
(0.021) (0.024) (0.037) (0.037)
Event −3· subs. care -0.008
(0.016)
Event −2· subs. care -0.010
(0.011)
Event 0· subs. care -0.003
(0.008)
Event +1· subs. care -0.017
(0.012)
Event +2· subs. care -0.022*
(0.012)
Event +3· subs. care -0.023
(0.014)
Event +4· subs. care -0.017
(0.017)
Event +5· subs. care -0.035*
(0.019)
Event +6· subs. care -0.034
(0.023)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N indiv. 1959 1959 1001 958 1767
N 21437 21437 11194 10243 19359
Notes: Event study estimates of male earnings relative to the year prior to the birth of their first child. The
interaction terms with childcare (care) indicate the differential effect if at the birth of the first child, there
are childcare facilities in the municipality of residence. The interaction terms with subsidized childcare
(subs. care) indicate the difference if at the birth of the first child, there are subsidized childcare facilities
in the municipality of residence compared to if there is no childcare. Standard errors are bootstrapped
(1000 replications) as the estimates of earnings changes are transformed into percentage changes after
the estimation by dividing the estimates by ˆearnings, i.e. predicted earnings when setting event time
dummies to zero.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Participation penalty, women
Overall Childcare Childcare & Childcare & Subsidized
Hh inc.>p50 Hh inc.≤p50 childcare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Event −3 -0.000 -0.002 0.011 -0.010 -0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012)
Event −2 -0.010 -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
Event 0 -0.022** -0.027** -0.013 -0.046*** -0.019*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011)
Event +1 -0.145*** -0.159*** -0.129*** -0.195*** -0.155***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.027) (0.018)
Event +2 -0.184*** -0.201*** -0.195*** -0.217*** -0.195***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.031) (0.021)
Event +3 -0.195*** -0.215*** -0.216*** -0.226*** -0.208***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.030) (0.036) (0.024)
Event +4 -0.207*** -0.223*** -0.227*** -0.235*** -0.213***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.034) (0.042) (0.028)
Event +5 -0.213*** -0.225*** -0.229*** -0.239*** -0.211***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.038) (0.048) (0.031)
Event +6 -0.207*** -0.233*** -0.244*** -0.239*** -0.221***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.042) (0.055) (0.035)
Event −3· care 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.021
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.018)
Event −2· care -0.009 -0.003 -0.015 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.022)
Event 0· care 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.015
(0.008) (0.005) (0.015) (0.010)
Event +1· care 0.021 0.002 0.037 0.052*
(0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.031)
Event +2· care 0.026 0.013 0.038 0.024
(0.019) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038)
Event +3· care 0.032 0.014 0.048* 0.040
(0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.039)
Event +4· care 0.026 0.012 0.040 0.007
(0.021) (0.028) (0.032) (0.042)
Event +5· care 0.017 -0.008 0.045 0.003
(0.022) (0.030) (0.034) (0.043)
Event +6· care 0.051** 0.015 0.089** 0.055
(0.023) (0.030) (0.036) (0.044)
Event −3· subs. care -0.014
(0.018)
Event −2· subs. care -0.010
(0.023)
Event 0· subs. care -0.012
(0.010)
Event +1· subs. care -0.036
(0.031)
Event +2· subs. care 0.001
(0.037)
Event +3· subs. care -0.012
(0.039)
Event +4· subs. care 0.021
(0.042)
Event +5· subs. care 0.009
(0.043)
Event +6· subs. care -0.007
(0.044)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N indiv. 1959 1959 1001 958 1767
N 21437 21437 11194 10243 19359
Notes: Event study estimates of female participation rates relative to the year prior to the birth of their
first child. The interaction terms with childcare (care) indicate the differential effect if at the birth of
the first child, there are childcare facilities in the municipality of residence. The interaction terms with
subsidized childcare (subs. care) indicate the difference if at the birth of the first child, there are subsidized
childcare facilities in the municipality of residence compared to if there is no childcare. Standard errors
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) as the estimates of earnings changes are transformed into percentage
changes after the estimation by dividing the estimates by ˆearnings, i.e. predicted earnings when setting
event time dummies to zero. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Participation penalty, men
Overall Childcare Childcare & Childcare & Subsidized
Hh inc.>p50 Hh inc.≤p50 childcare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Event −3 -0.012** -0.011 -0.006 -0.015 -0.008
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008)
Event −2 -0.008** -0.007 0.001 -0.016 -0.006
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006)
Event 0 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.009 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Event +1 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
Event +2 -0.015** -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 -0.013*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008)
Event +3 -0.015* -0.013 -0.014 -0.007 -0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
Event +4 -0.023** -0.026** -0.025** -0.019 -0.024**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012)
Event +5 -0.033*** -0.029** -0.023* -0.027 -0.031**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014)
Event +6 -0.042** -0.044** -0.040** -0.038 -0.046**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.029) (0.018)
Event −3· care -0.003 0.003 -0.011 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
Event −2· care -0.002 -0.007 0.002 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013)
Event 0· care -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012)
Event +1· care -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.015)
Event +2· care -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.018
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.019)
Event +3· care -0.004 -0.009 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
Event +4· care 0.006 -0.003 0.014 -0.011
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018)
Event +5· care -0.009 -0.023** 0.006 -0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.020)
Event +6· ccare 0.004 -0.002 0.010 -0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.021)
Event −3· subs. care -0.016
(0.013)
Event −2· subs. care -0.016
(0.013)
Event 0· subs. care -0.001
(0.012)
Event +1· subs. care 0.004
(0.015)
Event +2· subs. care 0.014
(0.019)
Event +3· subs. care -0.007
(0.012)
Event +4· subs. care 0.017
(0.017)
Event +5· subs. care 0.006
(0.020)
Event +6· subs. care 0.008
(0.021)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N indiv. 1959 1959 1001 958 1767
N 21437 21437 11194 10243 19359
Notes: Event study estimates of male participation rates relative to the year prior to the birth of their
first child. The interaction terms with childcare (care) indicate the differential effect if at the birth of
the first child, there are childcare facilities in the municipality of residence. The interaction terms with
subsidized childcare (subs. care) indicate the difference if at the birth of the first child, there are subsidized
childcare facilities in the municipality of residence compared to if there is no childcare. Standard errors
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) as the estimates of earnings changes are transformed into percentage
changes after the estimation by dividing the estimates by ˆearnings, i.e. predicted earnings when setting
event time dummies to zero. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Earnings penalty, household level
Overall Childcare Childcare & Childcare &
Perc. points change
Hh earn.>p50 Hh earn.≤p50
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event −3 -0.020** -0.022* -0.050*** 0.017
(0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Event −2 -0.013** -0.011 -0.022** 0.006
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Event 0 -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.088*** -0.079***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Event +1 -0.238*** -0.241*** -0.253*** -0.231***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
Event +2 -0.247*** -0.248*** -0.266*** -0.228***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Event +3 -0.248*** -0.246*** -0.272*** -0.215***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019)
Event +4 -0.255*** -0.257*** -0.288*** -0.214***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022)
Event +5 -0.260*** -0.257*** -0.283*** -0.221***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023)
Event +6 -0.265*** -0.263*** -0.301*** -0.206***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028)
Event −3· care 0.004 0.017 -0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.017)
Event −2· care -0.003 -0.001 -0.004
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Event 0· care 0.007 0.009 0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Event +1· care 0.005 0.000 0.021
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Event +2· care 0.002 -0.003 0.019
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
Event +3· care -0.004 -0.007 0.012
(0.010) (0.012) (0.017)
Event +4· care 0.003 -0.003 0.027
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
Event +5· care -0.006 -0.021 0.030
(0.013) (0.014) (0.020)
Event +6· care -0.004 -0.003 0.002
(0.015) (0.017) (0.023)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes Yes Yes
N indiv. 1959 1959 1001 958
N 21437 21437 11194 10243
Notes: Event study estimates of both parents’ combined earnings relative to the year prior to the birth
of their first child in columns (1)-(4) and of the female earnings share in column (5). The interaction
terms with childcare (care) indicate the differential effect if at the birth of the first child, there are
childcare facilities in the municipality of residence. Standard errors are bootstrapped (1000 replications)
as the estimates of earnings changes are transformed into percentage changes after the estimation by
dividing the estimates by ˆearnings, i.e., predicted earnings when setting event time dummies to zero.
In specification (5), the dependent variable is the female earnings share and estimates do not need to be
transformed. Standard errors here are clustered at the individual level. There are less observations in
specification (5) as the female earnings share cannot be calculated if both partners have an income of 0.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Female earnings share
Overall Hh inc. > p50 Hh inc. ≤ p50
(1) (2) (3)
Event −3 0.555 0.857 0.491
(0.735) (0.825) (1.228)
Event −2 0.347 -0.127 1.061
(0.463) (0.482) (0.788)
Event 0 -10.398*** -7.947*** -13.193***
(0.602) (0.739) (0.947)
Event +1 -25.617*** -23.336*** -28.389***
(0.800) (0.958) (1.268)
Event +2 -26.404*** -25.078*** -28.356***
(0.907) (1.081) (1.458)
Event +3 -28.063*** -26.445*** -30.516***
(1.034) (1.230) (1.661)
Event +4 -28.468*** -26.667*** -31.129***
(1.157) (1.368) (1.877)
Event +5 -28.285*** -26.647*** -30.711***
(1.298) (1.516) (2.131)
Event +6 -28.133*** -26.440*** -30.615***
(1.543) (1.776) (2.570)
Event −3· care 0.041 -0.465 0.620
(0.710) (0.789) (1.208)
Event −2· care -0.573 0.099 -1.279
(0.520) (0.513) (0.913)
Event 0· care 1.338*** 1.217** 1.311
(0.504) (0.564) (0.836)
Event +1· care 2.403*** 1.444* 3.280***
(0.728) (0.850) (1.179)
Event +2· care 2.423*** 1.565* 3.345***
(0.775) (0.898) (1.263)
Event +3· care 2.427*** 1.053 4.082***
(0.814) (0.960) (1.310)
Event +4· care 2.746*** 1.185 4.551***
(0.864) (1.030) (1.400)
Event +5· care 2.466*** 1.042 3.989***
(0.936) (1.110) (1.524)
Event +6· care 2.706*** 0.615 5.089***
(1.031) (1.196) (1.708)
Constant 38.462*** 45.624*** 37.699***
(2.085) (4.440) (2.792)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes Yes
N indiv. 1959 1001 958
N 21294 11149 10145
Notes: Event study estimates of the earnings share contributed by the woman to total household earnings
relative to the year prior to the birth of their first child. The interaction terms with childcare (care) indi-
cate the differential effect if at the birth of the first child, there are childcare facilities in the municipality
of residence. Constant refers to the average female income share after controlling for year FE, age FE,
married, and all the event indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Significance
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.8: Take-up: Effect on childcare deductions
Total amount P(deduction)
(1) (2)
Event 0 307.583*** 0.166***
(57.387) (0.018)
Event +1 645.668*** 0.295***
(82.153) (0.025)
Event +2 909.776*** 0.353***
(108.323) (0.030)
Event +3 1231.285*** 0.427***
(138.909) (0.037)
Event +4 1503.369*** 0.490***
(167.279) (0.044)
Event +5 1609.405*** 0.521***
(195.250) (0.050)
Event +6 1460.833*** 0.471***
(232.263) (0.061)
Event 0· care 0.739 -0.017
(27.827) (0.016)
Event +1· care 178.320*** 0.032
(46.934) (0.020)
Event +2· care 200.419*** 0.042**
(59.161) (0.021)
Event +3· care 291.782*** 0.056**
(82.931) (0.023)
Event +4· care 248.515** 0.021
(100.277) (0.025)
Event +5· care 228.496** 0.006
(110.802) (0.026)
Event +6· care 412.706*** 0.094***
(111.475) (0.026)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes
N indiv. 1959 1959
N 14760 14760
Notes: Event study estimates of filings for child deductions, in specification (1) using total amount
deduced in CHF as dependent variable and in specification (2) using an indicator set to one if a positive
amount is claimed as dependent variable. care, takes a value of one for treated municipalities after the
introduction of childcare and zero otherwise. The event time dummies capture changes relative to the
year before the opening of a childcare facility t = −1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure A.1: Probability of childbirth relative to the year before the opening of
childcare
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Note: Probability of childbirth relative to the year before the opening of a childcare facility. The
specification controls for year effects and individual fixed effects. Event time t = −4 includes
years ≤ −4 before the opening of a childcare facility. Event time t = 4 includes years ≥ 4 after
the opening of a childcare facility. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The
corresponding estimates can be found in column (2) of Table A.9 in Appendix A.
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Table A.9: Effect of childcare on fertility
DiD Event study
(1) (2)
Care 0.000
(0.001)
Mun. with care 0.001
(0.001)
Event −4 0.002
(0.003)
Event −3 0.003
(0.003)
Event −2 -0.001
(0.003)
Event 0 -0.001
(0.003)
Event +1 0.005
(0.003)
Event +2 -0.000
(0.003)
Event +3 -0.002
(0.003)
Event +4 -0.001
(0.003)
Year FE Yes Yes
Individual FE No Yes
N indiv. 30,480
N 494,601 190,453
N cluster 366
Notes: Event study estimates of fertility rates, once as a DiD around the opening of a childcare facility and
once as an event study around the opening of a childcare facility. In the DiD specification, municipalities
opening a childcare facility between 2001 and 2015 are defined as the treatment group (mun. with care).
Municipalities that have not opened a childcare facility by the end of 2015 are used as the control group.
The indicator care takes value one for treated municipalities after the introduction of childcare and zero
otherwise. Specification (2) only includes individuals in municipalities that did introduce childcare. The
event time indicators capture changes relative to the year before the opening of a childcare facility t = −1.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level for the DiD and at the individual level for the
event study. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.10: Robustness tests, women
Stayer Stayer Selection +- 3 yrs
subsid. care around opening
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event −3 0.008 0.009 -0.019** -0.026
(0.020) (0.021) (0.009) (0.026)
Event −2 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009* -0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.016)
Event 0 -0.270*** -0.271*** -0.253*** -0.278***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.015)
Event +1 -0.647*** -0.656*** -0.644*** -0.643***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.015)
Event +2 -0.662*** -0.671*** -0.667*** -0.669***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.006) (0.016)
Event +3 -0.689*** -0.697*** -0.697*** -0.688***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.018)
Event +4 -0.700*** -0.705*** -0.708*** -0.724***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.019)
Event +5 -0.704*** -0.709*** -0.721*** -0.717***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.023)
Event +6 -0.709*** -0.713*** -0.734*** -0.743***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.028)
Event −3· care -0.019 -0.010 -0.016 0.040*
(0.018) (0.035) (0.011) (0.023)
Event −2· care -0.019* -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.011) (0.017) (0.008) (0.018)
Event 0· care 0.033*** 0.064*** -0.002 0.044**
(0.013) (0.024) (0.009) (0.018)
Event +1· care 0.040** 0.003 -0.006 0.046*
(0.017) (0.037) (0.011) (0.024)
Event +2· care 0.037** 0.003 0.007 0.039
(0.018) (0.037) (0.012) (0.024)
Event +3· care 0.038** -0.006 0.001 0.044*
(0.019) (0.039) (0.013) (0.025)
Event +4· care 0.040* 0.002 0.010 0.066**
(0.020) (0.043) (0.015) (0.026)
Event +5· care 0.042* 0.009 0.011 0.046
(0.022) (0.048) (0.016) (0.029)
Event +6· care 0.054** 0.013 0.006 0.074**
(0.026) (0.045) (0.019) (0.035)
Event −3· subs. care -0.010
(0.020)
Event −2· subs. care -0.014
(0.013)
Event 0· subs. care 0.036**
(0.014)
Event +1· subs. care 0.057***
(0.019)
Event +2· subs. care 0.053***
(0.020)
Event +3· subs. care 0.050**
(0.021)
Event +4· subs. care 0.053**
(0.022)
Event +5· subs. care 0.055**
(0.024)
Event +6· subs. care 0.070**
(0.029)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes Yes Yes
N indiv. 1460 1336 4310 760
N 15978 14648 41595 8102
Notes: Event study estimates of female earnings relative to the year prior to the birth of their first child
for the robustness tests. The interaction terms with childcare (care) indicate the differential effect if at
the birth of the first child, there are childcare facilities in the municipality of residence. The interaction
terms with subsidized childcare (subs. care) indicate the difference if at the birth of the first child, there
are subsidized childcare facilities in the municipality of residence compared to if there is no childcare.
Standard errors are bootstrapped (1000 replications). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Robustness tests, men
Stayer Stayer Selection +- 3 yrs
subsid. care around opening
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event −3 -0.020 -0.017 -0.009 -0.041*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.010) (0.024)
Event −2 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010** -0.016
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.016)
Event 0 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.055***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.017)
Event +1 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.042*** 0.088***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.022)
Event +2 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.046*** 0.083***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.011) (0.024)
Event +3 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.052*** 0.095***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.013) (0.031)
Event +4 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.057*** 0.083**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.016) (0.037)
Event +5 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.069*** 0.131***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.019) (0.043)
Event +6 0.076** 0.074** 0.079*** 0.111**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.024) (0.052)
Event −3· care -0.003 0.020 -0.031*** 0.004
(0.016) (0.028) (0.011) (0.022)
Event −2· care -0.006 0.015 -0.011 -0.007
(0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.016)
Event 0· care -0.001 -0.011 0.007 -0.011
(0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.013)
Event +1· care -0.014 -0.023 0.022** -0.028*
(0.013) (0.025) (0.009) (0.016)
Event +2· care -0.017 -0.020 0.026** -0.032**
(0.014) (0.030) (0.012) (0.016)
Event +3· care -0.019 -0.024 0.041*** -0.034*
(0.016) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020)
Event +4· care -0.008 -0.010 0.039** -0.018
(0.019) (0.029) (0.016) (0.024)
Event +5· care -0.030 -0.033 0.028 -0.064**
(0.021) (0.034) (0.021) (0.029)
Event +6· care -0.030 -0.072* 0.017 -0.033
(0.025) (0.039) (0.025) (0.035)
Event −3· subs. care -0.010
(0.017)
Event −2· subs. care -0.012
(0.012)
Event 0· subs. care 0.002
(0.009)
Event +1· subs. care -0.016
(0.013)
Event +2· subs. care -0.021
(0.015)
Event +3· subs. care -0.022
(0.018)
Event +4· subs. care -0.015
(0.020)
Event +5· subs. care -0.036
(0.022)
Event +6· subs. care -0.022
(0.027)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes Yes Yes
N indiv. 1460 1336 4310 760
N 15978 14648 41595 8102
Notes: Event study estimates of male earnings relative to the year prior to the birth of their first child
for the robustness tests. The interaction terms with childcare (care) indicate the differential effect if at
the birth of the first child, there are childcare facilities in the municipality of residence. The interaction
terms with subsidized childcare (subs. care) indicate the difference if at the birth of the first child, there
are subsidized childcare facilities in the municipality of residence compared to if there is no childcare.
Standard errors are bootstrapped (1000 replications). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Figure A.2: Child penalty in municipalities in main sample compared to
municipalities which do not have a childcare facility by the end of 2015
(a) Effect of parenthood, women
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(b) Differential in child penalty, women
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Note: Panel (a) visualizes the percentage effect of parenthood on female earnings relative
to the year prior to the birth of the first child (t = −1) in municipalities that introduce
childcare at some point (Childcare), in years before they do, and in municipalities that
do not have childcare by the end of 2015 (No childcare). Confidence bounds are cal-
culated applying a non-parametric bootstrap and are displayed at the 5 percent level.
Panel (b) plots the estimated differences in the child penalty between the two groups of
municipalities.
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Histograms for placebo test
Figure A.3: Histograms of placebo test, women
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Note: Results of the placebo test where opening dates of childcare are randomly assigned
to municipalities that do not have childcare for women. Based on these placebo opening
dates, we replicate the analysis of the effect of childcare on earnings based on this sample.
The densities are the result of 1000 random assignments of opening dates. The red lines
show the actual estimates of the effect of childcare.
45
Figure A.4: Histograms of placebo test, men
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Note: Results of the placebo test where opening dates of childcare are randomly assigned
to municipalities that do not have childcare for men. Based on these placebo opening
dates, we replicate the analysis of the effect of childcare on earnings based on this sample.
The densities are the result of 1000 random assignments of opening dates. The red lines
show the actual estimates of the effect of childcare.
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Figure A.5: Child penalty of households depending on the gender of the
breadwinner in the household
Breadwinner earns > 50% of hh earnings
a) Female earnings penalty b) Male earnings penalty
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Breadwinner earns > 60% of hh earnings
c) Female earnings penalty d) Male earnings penalty
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Note: Comparison of child penalty among couples with female breadwinner and couples
with male breadwinner. The panels on the left display child penalties. Panel a) displays
the child penalty for women, depending on whether the man or the woman is the bread-
winner (earns more) in period t = −1. Panel b) reports the child penalty for men and
depending on who is the breadwinner in in period t = −1. Panels c) and d) are the same
as above, except that breadwinners are defined as earning at least 60% of the couple’s
combined earnings in t = −1. Note that, these estimates use all couples independent of
whether they had their first child in a municipality with childcare. Confidence bounds
are calculated at the 5 percent level of significance applying a non-parametric bootstrap.
The corresponding estimates are displayed in Table A.12.
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Table A.12: Child penalty conditional on gender of the breadwinner in the household
Breadwinner > 50% Breadwinner > 60%
Women Men Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event −3 -0.008 -0.057*** 0.058*** -0.067***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012)
Event −2 -0.008** -0.025*** 0.024*** -0.028***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
Event 0 -0.238*** 0.041*** -0.265*** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011)
Event +1 -0.590*** 0.041*** -0.597*** 0.057***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014)
Event +2 -0.608*** 0.043*** -0.604*** 0.054***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016)
Event +3 -0.637*** 0.050*** -0.626*** 0.057***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018)
Event +4 -0.648*** 0.053*** -0.632*** 0.061***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.022)
Event +5 -0.662*** 0.057*** -0.644*** 0.060**
(0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.028)
Event +6 -0.676*** 0.050*** -0.650*** 0.053*
(0.006) (0.015) (0.013) (0.029)
Event −3· female breadwinner -0.178*** 0.177*** -0.351*** 0.384***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.024) (0.019)
Event −2· female breadwinner -0.070*** 0.066*** -0.151*** 0.172***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.013)
Event 0· female breadwinner 0.023*** 0.037*** 0.028** 0.110***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.013)
Event +1· female breadwinner 0.004 0.048*** 0.029 0.158***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.015)
Event +2· female breadwinner 0.004 0.044*** 0.014 0.153***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.017)
Event +3· female breadwinner -0.009 0.045*** 0.000 0.144***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.022) (0.018)
Event +4· female breadwinner -0.005 0.046*** 0.004 0.140***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.024) (0.018)
Event +5· female breadwinner 0.007 0.046*** 0.021 0.151***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.025) (0.021)
Event +6· female breadwinner 0.007 0.047*** 0.003 0.149***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.030) (0.025)
Indiv. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Married (t<0) Yes Yes Yes Yes
N indiv. 10355 10355 4250 4250
N 112351 112351 45384 45384
Notes: Event study estimates of female and male earnings relative to the year prior to the birth of
their first child. The interaction terms with a female breadwinner dummy indicate the differential effect
between couples with a female breadwinner and couples with male breadwinner in period t − 1. The
sample includes couples in all municipalities, independent of information on childcare. In columns (1)
and (2), breadwinners are defined as accounting for more than 50% of a couple’s earnings, whereas in
columns (3) and (4), we only use couples, where the breadwinner accounts for more than 60% of combined
earnings. The breadwinner is female in 22.3% of all cases in columns (1) and (2) and in 14.7% of all
cases in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors are bootstrapped (1000 replications). Significance levels:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
48
ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische  
Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European  
Economic Research
L 7,1 · 68161 Mannheim · Germany 
Phone  +49 621 1235-01  
info@zew.de · zew.de
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW 
research promptly avail able to other economists in order 
to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. 
The authors are solely respons ible for the contents which 
do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW. 
IMPRINT
//
Download ZEW Discussion Papers from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/
or see:
https://www.ssrn.com/link/ZEW-Ctr-Euro-Econ-Research.html 
https://ideas.repec.org/s/zbw/zewdip.html
